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DOES THE SUPREME COURT MATTER? 
CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE INHERENT 
POLITICIZATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 
Matthew D. Lassiter* 
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY. By Michael ]. Klarman. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 2004. Pp. xii, 655. $35. 
I. BACKGROUND 
More than a decade ago, in a colloquium sponsored by the Virginia 
Law Review,1 scholars of the civil rights movement launched a fierce 
assault on Michael J. Klarman's2 interpretation of the significance of 
the Supreme Court's famous school desegregation ruling in Brown v. 
Board of Education.3 Klarman's "backlash thesis," initially set forth in 
a series of law review and history journal articles and now serving as 
the centerpiece of his new book, revolves around two central claims. 
First, he argues that the advancements toward racial equality generally 
attributed to Brown were instead the inevitable products of long-term 
political, social, and economic transformations that "would have 
undermined Jim Crow regardless of Supreme Court intervention."4 
Second, he credits Brown with a role in this historical process only 
through a chain of indirect causation: the Supreme Court decision 
galvanized massive resistance and racial violence in the South, which 
civil rights activists capitalized upon by engineering televised 
confrontations that mobilized public opinion across the nation, which 
created the climate for the passage of the federal civil rights and 
voting rights legislation of the mid-1960s, which directly and 
* Assistant Professor of History, University of Michigan. B.A. 1992, Furman; M.A. 
(History) 1994, Ph.D. (History) 1999, University of Virginia. 
1. Colloquium, Twentieth-Century Constitutional History, 80 VA. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
2. James Monroe Professor of Law and Professor of History, University of Virginia. 
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
4. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. 
REV. 7, 10 (1994). 
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profoundly transformed southern race relations.5 Although the 
contours of this general story are part of the standard historical 
narrative, firmly grounded in the secondary source literature and 
taught in almost every university classroom, Klarman's specific charge 
that civil rights scholars have greatly exaggerated the importance of 
Brown set off a bit of a firestorm. The first wave, which accompanied 
the 1994 Virginia Law Review article, included not only the expected 
differences of historiographical analysis but also criticism of a 
surprisingly personal nature. 
The response by David J. Garrow, titled Hopelessly Hollow 
History, ascribed Klarman's views on Brown to the "professorial urge 
for interpretive novelty," which often produces useful advancements 
but in some unfortunate cases results in "revisionist interpretations 
whose rhetorical excesses are quickly revealed for what they are when 
old, but indisputable historical evidence, is inconveniently brought 
back to the pictorial foreground."6 Garrow highlighted Klarman's 
failure to acknowledge the "direct influence of Brown on the 
instigation of the 1955 Montgomery [bus] boycott," a causal analysis 
that emphasizes the crucial inspiration for southern black activists who 
finally had the moral authority and legal force of the Supreme Court 
on their side. 7 While conceding Klarman's point that Brown resulted 
in little school desegregation during the decade after 1954, Garrow 
blamed the Court itself for emboldening resistance to its decree 
through the infamous "all deliberate speed" implementation 
guidelines known as Brown //.8 Under this scenario, primary fault for 
the limited reach of Brown rested in the justices' constrained vision of 
enforcement rather than in their premature placement of 
desegregation on the nation's political agenda. In the final sentence of 
his rejoinder, Garrow dismissed Klarman's entire project with 
undisguised condescension for the law professor treading on 
historians' turf: "[C]ommentators would be well-advised to keep their 
professional desire for interpretive novelty in check, for rhetorically 
excessive overstatements and oversimplifications oftentimes do turn 
5. Id.; see also Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash 
Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994). 
6. David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v. 
Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151, 151 (1994). Garrow is the author of a respected 
biography of Martin Luther King, Jr., and a massive history of Roe v. Wade, among other 
works. See DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE 
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986); DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY 
AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE. V. WADE (1994). 
7. Garrow, supra note 6, at 152. 
8. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown If]; Garrow, supra 
note 6, at 158-59. 
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out to be hopelessly hollow once a fuller understanding of the 
historical record is brought to bear. "9 
Mark Tushnet's critique, published in the same issue of the 
Virginia Law Review, offered a different variation of Garrow's 
indictment of careerist zealotry: 
Lawyers are notorious for producing law-office history, the result of the 
professional deformation in which judgment must be awarded to one or 
the other side. Law-office history reduces complexity and contradiction 
[tropes favored by academic historians] to simplicity and provides a story 
in which all evidence points to a single conclusion.10 
Tushnet contended that Klarman's backlash thesis underplayed the 
historical magnitude of Brown when understood as a Supreme Court 
proclamation of a "fundamental principle of constitutional law" -
that government policies designed to discriminate against black 
citizens are illegitimate a proposition with momentous 
consequences that have extended far beyond the particular arena of 
southern school desegregation.11 Turning to the details, Tushnet also 
charged that Klarman's inevitability framework represented "a largely 
determinist account of the transformation of race relations" and that 
the emphasis on the chain reaction of white violence in the South and 
white public opinion in the North "com[es] close to eliminating 
African Americans as historical agents."12 He concluded with the 
announcement that "[t]o the extent that Professor Klarman appears to 
believe that he has established the unimportance of Brown [as a 
declaration of constitutional principle] . . .  and to believe that he has 
deepened our understanding of the limits of judicial power, he is 
mistaken. "13 
Klarman's rebuttal, subtitled Facts and Political Correctness, struck 
back in kind. He began with the observation that "Brown v. Board of 
Education is today so politically sacrosanct that one cannot 
dispassionately discuss the decision's soundness as a matter of 
constitutional theory."14 Although both Garrow and Tushnet had 
9. Garrow, supra note 6, at 160. 
10. Mark Tushnet, The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 
173, 173 (1994). Tushnet is the author of a number of books about the history of civil rights 
litigation and jurisprudence. See MARK V. TuSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY 
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987) [hereinafter TuSHNET, NAACP's 
LEGAL STRATEGY]; see also MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD 
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1994). 
11. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 176. 
12. Id. at 174, 179. 
13. Id. at 184. 
14. Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education: Facts and Political Correctness, 
80 VA. L. REV. 185, 185 (1994) (citations omitted). 
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engaged Klarman almost exclusively on the immediate issues of 
historical causation and the evidentiary basis for these claims, his 
response quickly made it clear that a broader debate about the proper 
"limits of judicial power" undergirded his inquiry into the impact of 
Brown.1 5 The "political correctness" that circumscribed this academic 
discussion "can only be lamented," Klarman continued, "as Brown 
was not an unambiguously correct decision either for the justices or 
the American public in 1954, and to formulate constitutional theories 
on the basis of ahistorical judgments is at the very least 
unconstructive, and possibly quite insidious."16 Klarman then 
proceeded to marshal countervailing evidence against Garrow's claim 
that Brown directly inspired the civil rights demonstrations that 
followed, and he characterized Tushnet's accusation that the backlash 
thesis denied historical agency to black southerners as "not only 
inaccurate, but offensive."17 But Klarman emphasized that his critics 
were battling him only on a secondary front, because "[t]he cultural or 
symbolic account of Brown's significance has become . . .  something of 
a fallback position for those committed to preserving Brown's status 
as a judicial icon while unable to identify concrete ways in which the 
decision mattered. "18 
This debate, which has been reinvigorated with the publication of 
Klarman's lengthy and impressive book examining the Supreme Court 
and racial discrimination from Plessy to Brown, is deeply contentious 
in large part because its participants are starting from such different 
vantage points.19 To oversimplify only slightly, most historians who 
specialize in the fields of civil rights and African-American, southern, 
and urban studies do indeed consider Brown to be "unambiguously 
correct" and are not that bothered by law school anxieties about its 
"soundness as a matter of constitutional theory."20 (The most salient 
criticisms of Brown leveled by academic historians emanate from the 
left end of the spectrum, from scholars who question the 
assimilationist philosophy of the liberal integrationist agenda).21 
15. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 184. 
16. Klarman, supra note 14, at 185. 
17. Id. at 198. 
18. Id. at 186. 
19. In a special issue sponsored by The Nation and dedicated to the fiftieth anniversary 
of Brown, Klarman's interpretation of the relative insignificance of the 1954 decision placed 
him decidedly in the minority among the civil rights scholars who contributed, although 
almost every participant in the forum emphasized the nation's failure to achieve racial 
equality in public education. Eric Foner & Randall Kennedy, Brown at 50, NATION, May 3, 
2004, at 15. 
20. Klarman, supra note 14, at 185. 
21. See DARYL MICHAEL SCOTT, CONTEMPT AND PITY: SOCIAL POLICY AND THE 
IMAGE OF THE DAMAGED BLACK PSYCHE, 1880-1996 (1997). Historians of the "post­
integrationist" school also have been influenced by the critique of Brown associated with 
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Historians generally measure Supreme Court decisions on a scale of 
whether they advance or harm the struggle for social justice and racial 
equality - meaning that there is an effective consensus within the 
profession that Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu were wrongly 
decided, and a widely shared belief that the most important lesson of 
Brown is how far the nation still has to go to live up to its promises.22 
Many historians reflexively believe that judicial activism is necessary 
to achieve liberal policy outcomes, a stance undoubtedly shaped by 
the overall thrust of the Supreme Court decisions of the Warren era, 
and they tend to be suspicious that theories of constitutional law 
designed to limit judges from issuing countermajoritarian rulings are 
animated by original-intent conservatism or some other undertaking 
associated with the political right. In short, academic historians who 
specialize in modem American society and politics effectively have 
embraced a results-oriented rather than a process-oriented standard 
for evaluating constitutional law, including a firm belief that judges 
should expand and defend the rights of oppressed minorities and that 
countermajoritarian decisions are often an essential component of this 
mission.23 
Klarman has been a vocal proponent of political process theory, an 
approach to constitutional law that seeks to reconcile judicial review 
with democracy "by demonstrating that judicial review consists of 
something other than judges simply replacing legislative policy 
judgments with their own."24 The "countermajoritarian problem,'' in 
Klarman's view, can be resolved only through a constitutional theory 
that limits judicial activism to those situations in which the outcome of 
such intervention can be demonstrated to be more democratic than 
Derrick A. Bell. See DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE 
PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); see also DERRICK A. BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN 
V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004). 
22. See, e.g., Forum, Beyond Black, White, and Brown, NATION, May 3, 2004, at 17-24. 
In recent years, a growing number of historians have moved beyond the widespread 
interpretation of Brown as an unfulfilled promise in order to emphasize the inherent 
limitations of the school desegregation decision as an expression of a particular strain of 
postwar liberalism. From this view, Brown symbolizes a larger liberal project (understood in 
contemporary terms as the "American Dilemma") that misdiagnosed the structural 
foundations of white supremacy in its emphasis on eradicating individual racism and 
obscured the national and multiracial scope of systematic discrimination against minorities 
in its concentration on the regional and biracial context of Jim Crow. See also Kevin Gaines, 
Round Table: Brown v. Board of Education, Fifty Years After: Whose Integration Was It? 91 
J. AM. HIST. 19 (2004). 
23. For a synthetic history that is representative of this results-oriented approach, see 
ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (1998). 
24. Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 747, 768 (1991). 
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the legislative choices of elected representatives.25 In the early 1990s, 
Klarman carved out an exception that justified Brown within the 
political process framework, based on the argument that the nearly 
universal disfranchisement 'of black southerners characterized Jim 
Crow as an undemocratic system and the counterfactual (and 
qualified) hypothesis that "effective enforcement of black voting 
rights possibly would have rendered Brown unnecessary."26 He 
concluded: 
to the extent that Brown does not rest on southern black 
disfranchisement, it cannot be justified under political process 
theory .. . It is time we abandon the premise that Brown must have 
been correct when decided (leaving aside the widespread 
disfranchisement of southern blacks) ... simply because in today's world 
the result is so morally unimpeachable. 27 
To complicate the issue further, the other participant in the 1994 
Virginia Law Review colloquium, Gerald N. Rosenberg, rebuked the 
backlash thesis as a product of tortured reasoning that greatly 
exaggerated the actual effect of Brown (the opposite charge of the 
other critics), driven by Klarman's complicity in the mission to 
preserve the decision's iconic status as a "symbol of the use of courts 
to produce significant social reform," which "provides legitimacy and 
a sense of purpose to liberal-leaning legal academics."28 
And now, appearing on the fiftieth anniversary of Brown, Michael 
Klarman's ambitious first book asks legal scholars and especially civil 
rights historians to reconsider the question of how much the Supreme 
Court really matters in American politics and society. Despite the 
overheated rhetoric from some civil rights specialists in response to 
Klarman's initial presentation of the backlash thesis, historians can 
learn a lot from his analysis of various Supreme Court cases and his 
warning against placing excessive faith in the judicial branch as a 
vanguard of social change. The counterfactual and overly speculative 
nature of the book's central thesis, however, probably will not 
convince many partisans to abandon their celebration of the 1954 
decision as a landmark in the struggle for racial equality. Klarman also 
details at great length the broader historical developments that shaped 
the trajectory of civil rights case law, a narrative that is comprehensive 
and compelling but drawn primarily from the secondary source 
25. Id.; see also Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A 
Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759 
(1992). 
26. Klarman, supra note 24, at 807. 
27. Id. at 815, 819. 
28. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Brown Is Dead! Long Live Brown! The Endless Attempt To 
Canonize a Case, SO VA. L. REV. 161, 171 (1994). Rosenberg is also the author of the book 
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
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literature, and these sections may be of greater interest to legal 
scholars seeking to understand the context surrounding judicial 
decisions than to historians who may already be familiar with the 
events. This hybrid book simultaneously presents a historical inquiry 
into the effects of Brown alongside a theoretical analysis of the 
political and social forces that govern judicial decisionmaking. 
Klarman is almost certainly right that historians have overstated the 
power and the inclination of the judicial branch to lead the nation 
toward greater social justice, but he also remains vulnerable to the 
admonition that history practiced by constitutional lawyers can flatten 
into a teleological narrative "in which all evidence points to a single 
conclusion." 29 From Jim Crow to Civil Rights offers a plausible though 
debatable account of the direct and indirect consequences of Brown 
during the decade after 1954, but the book's most notable weakness is 
the failure to interrogate with any rigor the principal claim that the 
1964 Civil Rights Act and not the federal courts played the definitive 
role in dismantling Jim Crow in the public schools of the South during 
the decade that followed. 
II. THEPLESSYERA 
Although the relationship between Brown and racial change 
represents the book's overarching theme, Klarman does not turn to 
the 1954 decision until page 290 of the volume. The first third of From 
Jim Crow to Civil Rights surveys the Court's most significant civil 
rights rulings during the Plessy era of legal segregation; the middle 
section portrays World War II as the genuine watershed for black­
white race relations; and the final third explores the context of Brown 
and the political backlash against school desegregation in the South. 
Klarman begins by contrasting the regressive racial climate of the late 
1890s with the progressive currents of the mid-1950s, and the 
introduction sets forth a three-part agenda for the chapters that 
follow: to recount the forces that underlaid the substantial racial 
advancements that took place during this half-century; to investigate 
the dynamics that produced key judicial rulings, including Plessy and 
Brown; and to measure the extent to which the Supreme Court shaped 
the broader political and social milieu of racial discrimination and civil 
rights (p. 4). Klarman explains that the judicial decisionmaking 
process operates simultaneously along a political and a legal axis, 
although "because constitutional law is generally quite indeterminate, 
constitutional interpretation almost inevitably reflects the broader 
social and political context of the times" (p. 5). Such a perspective on 
29. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 173. 
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constitutional history suggests that "justices are unlikely to be either 
heroes or villains . . .  [because] they rarely hold views that deviate far 
from dominant public opinion" (p. 6). This assessment means that the 
Supreme Court essentially moved with the flow of national sentiment 
when it invalidated de jure segregation in Brown, and also that the 
justices merely sanctioned mainstream legal and political trends when 
they originally sustained Jim Crow six decades earlier in Plessy, which 
is where the story begins. 
In the first chapter, Klarman presents a solid case that Plessy v. 
Ferguson, widely viewed today as one of the Supreme Court's most 
indefensible decisions, actually represented a reasonable outcome in 
the political context of the time and indeed was never even a close 
call.30 He argues that the civil rights decisions of the Plessy Court 
(1895-1910) "reflected, far more than they created, the regressive 
racial climate of the era" (p. 9). During the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century, the end of Reconstruction accompanied a wave of 
lynchings and political violence targeting black voters in the South, 
northern public opinion and Republican party policy shifted decisively 
against federal intervention to protect civil rights, the third-party 
Populist movement's brief flirtation with biracial alliances galvanized 
powerful Democratic appeals to racial unity, and imperialist 
adventures abroad fostered a desire for sectional reconciliation 
grounded in a transregional public culture of white supremacy (pp. 10-
15). As an antidote to pervasive racial violence, and in an effort to 
stabilize the forces unleashed by industrialization and urbanization, 
many leading figures in the South and the North viewed segregation 
and disfranchisement as progressive methods of managing race 
relations. For a number of historians, the "New South" project of 
economic modernization through racial peace and stability holds the 
key to understanding the advent of the Jim Crow system.31 Klarman 
recognizes the links between Progressive reform and racial 
segregation and disfranchisement but does not make this explanation 
as central to his analysis as the aforementioned political factors.32 He 
30. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
31. See, e.g., EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFI'ER 
RECONSTRUCDON (1992); PAUL M. GASTON, THE NEW SOUTH CREED: A STUDY IN 
SOUTHERN MYTHMAKING (1970); GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM 
CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-
1920 (1996). 
32. Pp. 21-22, 38. Progressive reformers in both the South and the North believed that 
segregation and disfranchisement provided forward-looking resolutions to interracial 
violence, a modernized version of scientifically managed race relations. Although Klarman 
cites the relevant historical literature on this point, the Progressive version of the origins of 
segregation moves somewhat at cross-purposes with his broader argument that the steady 
deterioration of race relations and the regressive racial climate of the late 1800s culminated 
in the political and judicial transitions of the Plessy era. See generally id. 
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also contends, in a strained effort at disaggregation that serves to 
minimize the legal foundations of Jim Crow, that the Plessy Court's 
legitimation of the emerging framework of de jure segregation and 
racially motivated disfranchisement did not make much difference 
because "the oppression of blacks was largely the work of forces other 
than law" (p. 10). 
The major civil rights decisions issued by the Plessy Court involved 
state-mandated segregation in transportation along with challenges to 
ostensibly race-neutral public policies governing voting and jury 
service clearly designed to further discrimination in their application. 
Klarman argues that the Republican architects of the Fourteenth 
Amendment might have believed they were banning segregation on 
railroads but almost certainly did not intend to invalidate segregation 
in public education (pp. 18-27). Although the Supreme Court during 
this period never ruled directly on laws requiring school segregation, 
the 1896 decision in Plessy upheld a Louisiana railroad statute that 
mandated separate and equivalent facilities for black and white 
passengers. The majority opinion distinguished between political and 
social equality (p. 21), with only the former protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a verdict Klarman attributes to judicial 
validation of the fact that racial segregation "simply mirrored the 
preferences of most white Americans" (p. 22). He also points out that 
Plessy (contrary to popular mythology) "did not hold that the 
Constitution required racially separate facilities to be equal" and that 
in subsequent rulings the justices made it clear that black public 
schools and other segregated accommodations need only meet a 
minimum standard of reasonableness rather than a strict standard of 
equality (p. 46). Then, in the first of many counterfactual scenarios 
employed throughout the book to emphasize the limited effect of 
Supreme Court decisions, Klarman concludes that the federal 
government would not and could not have enforced an alternative 
judicial decision that invalidated segregation in the South (pp. 47-52). 
Not that it would have mattered, however, because "there is no direct 
evidence that Plessy led to an expansion of segregation" (p. 48) and 
"more favorable Court rulings, even if enforceable, would not have 
appreciably alleviated the oppression of southern blacks" (p. 60). 
Does constitutional law then matter much at all? It is hard not to 
conclude, given the bold and sweeping nature of these assertions and 
the ambiguity and complexity of the evidence at hand, that Klarman 
has constructed a teleological model of historical change in which 
political and social forces always determine the outcome of judicial 
processes but the cause-and-effect relationship almost never moves 
appreciably in the opposite direction. The problem with this 
framework is not only that the legal culture of white supremacy 
represented one of the central pillars of the Jim Crow system that 
1410 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 103:1401 
governed the South from the 1890s until the 1960s, and therefore that 
both civil rights activists and defenders of racial segregation focused 
on the public spaces under authority of the law as the critical sphere of 
confrontation during the postwar struggle for racial equality.33 The 
problem is also that, even during the Plessy era, the Supreme Court's 
refusal to investigate the extralegal (e.g. "subconstitutional") 
subterfuges employed to discriminate against blacks actively fortified 
the emerging political culture of white supremacy in ways that 
challenge Klarman's model of judicial minimalism. In the area of voter 
disfranchisement, southern legislatures operated within the technical 
confines of the Fifteenth Amendment, adopting suffrage restrictions 
such as literacy tests that vested substantial administrative discretion 
in local officials, obvious subterfuges designed to discriminate in 
practice despite their statutory race neutrality. In Williams v. 
Mississippi, the Court declined - despite sufficient precedent - to 
scrutinize either the legislative motive or the state action that 
undergirded the disfranchisement of black citizens (pp. 28-39).34 In the 
area of jury service, the Court likewise articulated a legal principle of 
racial nondiscrimination but "essentially invited nullification" (p. 55) 
by refusing to investigate the administrative discretion that achieved 
the systematic exclusion of blacks (pp. 39-43, 55-57). 
Klarman largely substantiates his claim that the Plessy Court's civil 
rights decisions represented "plausible interpretations of conventional 
legal sources" and accurate reflections of white public opinion, and 
therefore the corollary that "these rulings were not blatant 
nullifications of post-Civil War constitutional amendments designed to 
secure racial equality" (p. 9). But this does not necessarily confirm his 
broader thesis about the minimal effect of the Plessy-era decisions on 
the path of history. Klarman's belief in judicial minimalism downplays 
the import of having the institution of the Supreme Court - and not 
just southern vigilantes or political demagogues or even Progressive­
era reformers - extend the federal government's stamp of 
constitutional approval to a formal legal system that operated on the 
basis of the systematic racial subordination of African Americans. 
33. Klarman briefly remarks that "[e]ven if Plessy did not inspire the expansion of 
segregation, it may have provided legitimacy to the practice and thus delayed its eventual 
demise." P. 48. Most historians of the Jim Crow period and the civil rights movement would 
dispense with the speculative verb choice and then consider this statement of possibility to 
be demonstrably true. Leaving aside the debate about the immediate influence of Plessy, 
Klarman's thesis of the minimal impact of Supreme Court decisions on society and politics 
fails adequately to explore the issue of whether precedents such as Plessy imposed 
substantial constraints on the struggle for racial equality several decades down the road, 
projecting the constitutional law of one era into a substantially altered historical context. 
The judicial reasoning in Plessy certainly shaped and constricted the litigation strategies of 
the NAACP. See TuSHNET, NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY, supra note 10. 
34. 170 U.S. 213 (1898). 
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"Jim Crow legislation was generally more symbolic than functional," 
according to Klarman, because "[w)hite supremacy depended less on 
law than on entrenched social mores, backed by economic power and 
the threat and reality of violence" (p. 82). But surely it is not simply a 
coincidence that a relatively stable racial order marked the four 
decades between the turn of the twentieth century and the beginning 
of World War II, the same era during which the Plessy Court's 
validation of legal segregation and black disfranchisement remained 
operative. Nor is it incidental that substantial black activism and 
corresponding white violence marked the fluid and unsettled racial 
climate that existed during the decades before the Supreme Court's 
endorsement of segregation and disfranchisement in the late 1890s, 
and also during the period after the federal judiciary began to chip 
away at both policies beginning in the 1940s.35 
The Supreme Court's overt willingness to tolerate state-action 
subterfuges that enforced anti-black discrimination through race­
neutral facades also helped to shape the legal underpinnings of racial 
inequality and provided a segregationist road map for southern (and 
northern) policymakers throughout the twentieth century. Between 
1910 and 1920, the Court issued a series of rulings that invalidated 
forced peonage laws, grandfather clauses, separate-and-unequal 
luxury accommodations in railroad cars, and city ordinances 
mandating residential segregation.36 These cases, which Klarman aptly 
characterizes as "concerned more with form than substance," were 
therefore "easy to circumvent" as long as legislatures continued to pay 
lip service to constitutional principles (p. 62). For example, beginning 
in the 1920s the NAACP mounted an aggressive assault on residential 
segregation, which emerged as a decidedly national phenomenon as a 
result of urbanization in the South and the First Great Migration of 
blacks to the North. But the federal courts upheld restrictive racial 
covenants under the doctrine of private property rights until the late 
1940s, and they have never seriously challenged "racially motivated 
but facially neutral zoning" (p. 92) and other public policies that offer 
ample evidence of state action.37 In the area of criminal law, the 
35. Stability and fluidity are relative concepts, and I do not mean to suggest a calcified 
racial order between 1900 and 1940. For two differing interpretations of this period, see 
NEIL R. MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 
(1989); J. DOUGLAS SMITH, MANAGING WHITE SUPREMACY: RACE, POLITICS, AND 
CITIZENSHIP IN JIM CROW VIRGINIA (2002). 
36. Pp. 61-97. The only one of these decisions that might seem to be a substantive step 
forward, the invalidation of a Louisville residential segregation ordinance, pivoted on a 
defense of property rights more than racial equality and did not noticeably alter housing 
patterns. S ee p. 82; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
37. Pp. 142-46. Historians and social scientists have emphasized the centrality of state 
action through public policies that established and reinforced patterns of residential 
segregation. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION 
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Supreme Court expanded the scope of due process during the interwar 
period to rescue black victims of grossly unjust trials, but these 
individual (rather than class-action) cases did almost nothing to 
remedy the structural racism that pervaded the southern legal system 
(pp. 117-35, 152-58). During the New Deal era, the justices did signal a 
greater willingness to consider the state action dilemma in cases 
involving the all-white primary in Texas and the failure of Missouri to 
provide a substantively equal law school for a black applicant in the 
Gaines litigation brought by the NAACP.38 The civil rights group 
ensured that voting discrimination and substantive equality in public 
education would remain on the judicial agenda during and after World 
War II, the turning point in Klarman's story. 
III. THEW ATERSHED 
World War II serves as the watershed in Klarman's account of the 
transformation of race relations in twentieth-century United States 
history (pp. 173-96). Broader political and ideological trends directly 
shaped the increased judicial activism of the Supreme Court, because 
"[n]ot until World War II catalyzed fundamental shifts in U.S. racial 
attitudes and practices did the justices begin transforming the 
constitutional jurisprudence of race" (p. 152). The Second Great 
Migration of black southerners to the urban North altered the calculus 
of national politics and placed racial equality on the agenda of postwar 
liberalism. Fighting a war against fascism inspired growing numbers of 
African-American citizens to mobilize for democracy at home and 
also encouraged many white Americans to reconsider ideologies of 
white supremacy and black inferiority. Massive federal spending 
programs, stretching from the New Deal through the Cold War, 
launched an economic revolution in the South that underlaid long­
term demographic and political changes. The Soviet Union publicized 
southern lynchings and northern race riots as evidence of American 
hypocrisy, creating a "Cold War imperative for racial change" (p. 183) 
that Klarman presents as probably the most significant factor in 
transforming elite opinion and civil rights jurisprudence. Franklin 
Roosevelt and Harry Truman also completely reconfigured the 
makeup of the conservative Court of the early New Deal period, and 
the new justices began to move aggressively into areas of civil rights 
OF THE UNITED STATES (1985); see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, 
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). 
Klarman approaches this debate more from the perspective of constitutional theory, with the 
observation that one's stance on the presence or absence of state action in many areas of 
racial inequality is largely a product of personal political values. See pp. 138-39. 
38. Pp. 100-16, 135-42, 146-52, 160-70; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 
(1938). 
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and civil liberties.39 Klarman observes that because of the rapid shift in 
public opinion that resulted from the dynamics of World War II and 
the Cold War rationale for black equality, "the justices seemed willing 
to vindicate nearly any claim for progressive racial reform, even if 
doing so required considerable legal creativity" (p. 173). 
In Smith v. Allwright, eight of the justices invalidated the all-white 
primary in Texas under an expansive interpretation of state-action 
theory, in the process overruling a unanimous Supreme Court 
precedent that had reached the opposite conclusion only nine years 
earlier (pp. 197-204).40 Klarman argues that several justices 
"subordinated their understanding of law to politics" (p. 204), and he 
further asserts that "to focus on judicial turnover as the explanation 
for Smith is to miss the fundamental importance of World War 11."41 
This particular Court decision produced immediate and substantial 
repercussions in southern politics, primarily in the major cities where 
the percentage of black adults registered to vote increased 
dramatically (pp. 236-53). Six years later, in response to the NAACP 
stratagem of using the Gaines precedent to challenge the absence of 
substantive equality in higher education, the Court "functionally 
overruled Plessy" in a pair of cases from Texas and Oklahoma (p. 
205). Sweatt v. Painter unanimously ordered the admission of a black 
plaintiff to the University of Texas Law School, under the reasoning 
that a segregated alternative provided by the state lacked the tangible 
and intangible qualities necessary for an equal education.42 "Had 
separate but equal always meant this," Klarman comments, "the South 
could not have constructed a social system around it" (p. 208). On the 
same day in 1950, the McLaurin ruling forbade the University of 
Oklahoma from segregating a black graduate student within its 
facilities.43 A majority of states in the border and upper South slowly 
began to comply with the higher education decisions, but political 
39. Klarman cites the role of political process theory in the expansion of constitutional 
jurisprudence that accelerated in the 1940s, and he also contends that the emergence of the 
Cold War rationale for racial egalitarianism offers a better explanation than the altered 
makeup of the Supreme Court for the liberal opinions of the postwar era. See pp. 193-96; see 
also Klarman, supra note 24. 
40. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
41. P. 200. Lacking direct evidence from internal Court deliberations, Klarman 
speculates that the justices "must have been tempted" to move closer to democracy at home 
during a war fought under expanding that ideology abroad, which "probably influenced 
judicial thinking about the white primary." Id. Klarman is probably correct in this 
assessment, but some scholars may be unconvinced by the either-or need to disaggregate the 
effect of judicial turnover from the transformative impact of the war, an impulse driven 
more by the desire to support a specific theory of the development of constitutional law than 
to portray the multiplicity of causal factors behind most historical events. 
42. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
43. McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
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resistance effectively nullified the rulings in the Deep South, a 
subregion that also continued to oppress black voters in extralegal 
defiance of Smith (pp. 204-11, 253-61). Klarman concludes that the 
voting rights and higher education cases are "best explained in terms 
of social and political change," including not only the decisionmaking 
process of the justices but also the evolution of white racial attitudes in 
the more moderate areas of the urban and upper South where 
enforcement of these rulings actually happened (p. 209). 
As Klarman's primary causal explanation for constitutional 
jurisprudence, "public opinion" is an undoubtedly important but also 
fairly elastic framework of analysis. Consider the Supreme Court's 
precedent-breaking ruling in Shelley v. Kraemer, which outlawed 
judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants as a violation of 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (pp. 212-
17).44 For several decades, the federal courts repeatedly had found 
racial covenants to be constitutional as a form of private 
discrimination beyond the scope of state action. "Rarely have the 
justices changed their minds about an issue so swiftly and 
unanimously," Klarman observes, "but then, rarely has public opinion 
on any issue changed as rapidly as public opinion on race did in the 
postwar years" (p. 215). But what if Shelley had gone the other way, or 
more likely, if the Court had continued to decline to review challenges 
to the well-established precedent? Ample evidence exists from the 
postwar period to demonstrate that, as Klarman also observes, "most 
northern whites opposed integrating their own neighborhoods, 
[although] they increasingly favored suppressing the more extreme 
aspects of southern Jim Crow" (p. 193). In other words, the same 
climate-of-public-opinion thesis employed to explain Shelley could just 
as easily have explained the opposite result. At any rate, the Supreme 
Court did not extend the state-action theory in Shelley to cover other 
public policies that entrenched residential segregation in America's 
metropolitan regions during the postwar decades, including the 
racially discriminatory effects of municipal zoning and planning 
policies combined with federal mortgage programs, urban renewal, 
and highway construction.45 Klarman's flexible model attributes this to 
judicial disinclination to "contravene dominant public opinion on 
housing segregation" (p. 264), but it is also crucial to understand a 
point not emphasized in this book: that in the metropolitan regions, 
these state-sponsored patterns of residential segregation would shape 
44. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
45. Pp. 261-74; see also JACKSON, supra note 37. 
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the responses of southern (and eventually northern) whites to the 
school desegregation mandate set forth in Brown.46 
Klarman's account of the internal deliberations among the justices 
as they contemplated the Brown decision is fascinating. More than 
one-third of the states still mandated school segregation in the early 
1950s, and the five cases combined into Brown included two from the 
rural South, two from cities in the border region, and one from the 
District of Columbia (pp. 292-312). Evidence from the private papers 
of several justices reveals that a majority "were deeply conflicted" 
over the case, which the swing faction viewed as a conflict between 
constitutional law and personal political values (p. 293). Klarman 
believes that the ruling could have gone either way, but in the end the 
Court achieved unanimity in the resolution to overturn Plessy, 
following Chief Justice Earl Warren's argument that "we must act but 
we should do it in a tolerant way" (p. 302). Although Brown's 
repudiation of statutory school segregation moved the Supreme Court 
into a leading role in the movement for racial equality, especially 
compared to the inaction of the political branches of the federal 
government, Klarman fits the decision into his public opinion 
framework by noting that white sentiment nationwide roughly divided 
in half. "Brown is not an example of the Court's resistance to 
majoritarian sentiment," he concludes, "but rather of its conversion of 
an emerging national consensus into a constitutional command" (p. 
310). The 1955 implementation order in Brown II provides support for 
his thesis that the decision did not move very far beyond national 
public opinion, as the Supreme Court "chose vagueness and 
gradualism" instead of the NAACP's request for immediate 
compliance with firm guidelines (p. 313). The justices worried that an 
unenforceable order would weaken the public authority of the 
Supreme Court, and the policy of gradualism also mirrored the 
preferences of white southern moderates and many northern liberals. 
Decentralized desegregation enforcement on a timetable of "all 
deliberate speed" appeared to be a pragmatic compromise between 
constitutional rights and political realities (pp. 312-20). 
Brown II invites historians to engage in a different version of 
Klarman's counterfactual hypothesis that the racial liberalization 
unleashed by World War II would have undermined Jim Crow even 
without the intervention of the Supreme Court.47 Students of the civil 
46. I have argued elsewhere that constitutional law (and political discourse) established 
a false dichotomy between de jure and de facto segregation during the post-1945 era, in the 
interlinked areas of housing and education, because a history of state-sponsored policies of 
residential segregation shaped spatial landscapes and "neighborhood schools" assignment 
plans in the metropolitan regions of the South and the North. See MATIHEW D. LASSITER, 
THE SILENT MAJORITY: SUBURBAN POLITICS IN THE SUNBELT SOUTH (2005). 
47. See pp. 344-442; see also Klarman, supra notes 4-5. 
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rights movement have highlighted the period of relative calm that 
followed the initial Brown ruling, especially in the residentially 
segregated metropolitan areas and in the states of the upper and outer 
South that contained smaller percentages of black residents.48 Massive 
resistance to school desegregation fully emerged as a regional political 
movement only in the aftermath of Brown II, and some scholars have 
concluded that the lesson of "all deliberate speed" is that court­
ordered desegregation must be implemented rapidly and 
comprehensively instead of incrementally to be successful.49 Klarman 
observes that the implementation decree "invited delay by recalcitrant 
school boards and district judges and provided inadequate political 
cover for those who were willing to comply in good faith" (p. 317). But 
then he asks rhetorically if the Court's "miscalculation matter[ ed] 
much? Probably not" (p. 320). Moving beyond the speculative, 
Klarman demonstrates that the Brown II warning that popular 
opposition would not be permitted to delay the enforcement of 
constitutional law represented little more than a proforma declaration 
that the justices themselves "did not take seriously" (p. 318). 
Historians have tended to critique the gradualist and tokenist 
desegregation plans supported by white southern moderates as 
obvious subterfuges that subverted the original spirit of Brown, but 
Klarman provides a convincing reminder that the Supreme Court 
declined to review minimalist formulas approved by district judges and 
explicitly affirmed allegedly race-neutral · pupil placement laws 
designed to maintain as much segregation as possible by vesting 
discretion in local officials (pp. 321-43). 
During the first decade after Brown, the amount of school 
desegregation accomplished under the "all deliberate speed" regime 
turned out to be extremely limited. The Supreme Court decision did 
accelerate desegregation in the border states, although "freedom-of­
choice" assignment plans and "neighborhood schools" policies that 
reflected residential segregation combined to keep most black 
students in single-race schools (pp. 344-48). In the eleven states that 
formed the heart of the South, Brown triggered a political showdown 
between white moderates in the metropolitan regions who supported 
legal compliance and uncompromising segregationists from the rural 
countryside who demanded massive resistance. Legislatures in the 
Deep South, along with their counterparts in Virginia and Arkansas, 
enacted massive resistance programs that revolved around the 
48. See, e.g . ,  WILLIAM H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, 
NORTH CAROLINA, AND THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM (1980). 
49. The most forceful argument that successful court-ordered desegregation depends 
upon sweeping change instead of incrementalism can be found in JENNIFER L. 
HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION (1984). 
May 2005] From Jim Crow to Civil Rights 1417 
abandonment of public education in response to any degree of court­
ordered desegregation. President Eisenhower maintained a position of 
neutrality on Brown until 1957, when mob violence and blatant 
political nullification of a judicial mandate forced him to send federal 
troops to escort black students to a white school in Little Rock. 
Moderate leaders in the cities and suburbs tended to favor minimal 
desegregation rather than outright defiance, but the systematic 
malapportionment of state legislatures empowered rural counties over 
metropolitan regions, and public opinion did not shift markedly 
toward compliance until after segregationist politicians closed public 
schools in Virginia and Arkansas.50 Except for Cooper v. Aaron, which 
refused to tolerate violence as a rationale for postponement in Little 
Rock, the Supreme Court stayed above the school desegregation fray 
during the decade after Brown (pp. 324-34).51 Moderation ultimately 
replaced massive resistance across the region, but under policies of 
gradualism and tokenism only one percent of southern black students 
attended desegregated schools in 1964 (p. 362). Klarman observes that 
"[t]he federal judiciary, acting without any congressional or much 
presidential backing, had proved powerless to accomplish more" (pp. 
362-63). 
IV. FEDERAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
The final chapter of From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, nearly one 
hundred pages in length, provides a detailed narrative of Klarman's 
backlash thesis that Brown played a significant role in the racial 
transformation of the South only through an indirect and ironic causal 
chain that ultimately led to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (pp. 344-442). 
If Brown accomplished only a limited amount of actual desegregation 
during its first decade, the ruling played a direct role in the 
radicalization of southern politics by making race the dominant theme 
for a generation, especially in the most resistant Deep South states 
targeted by the direct-action wing of the civil rights movement. 
Klarman offers a two-part argument about the relationship between 
the Supreme Court and the civil rights movement: "Brown was less 
directly responsible than is commonly supposed for the direct-action 
protests of the 1960s and more responsible for ensuring that those 
50. Pp. 385-421. If the Supreme Court had jettisoned the "political questions" doctrine 
and invalidated legislative malapportionment before Brown, instead of waiting until the 
reapportionment cases of the early 1960s, moderates would have enjoyed a much stronger 
position vis-a-vis massive resisters in southern politics, and "massive resistance might have 
played out rather differently." P. 415. For an extended version of this thesis, see LASSITER, 
supra note 46. 
51. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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demonstrations were brutally suppressed by southern law enforcement 
officers" (p. 364). He concedes almost no ground to the scholars52 who 
have previously criticized the backlash thesis for failing to connect the 
dots between Brown and civil rights protests such as the Montgomery 
bus boycott. Instead Klarman argues that the evidence for drawing 
such a direct connection is weak and inconclusive, and at any rate 
"[d]eep background forces set the stage for mass racial protest. Brown 
was not the spark that ignited it" (p. 377). Brown mattered most, 
according to Klarman's formula, in the political arena of the Deep 
South, where the backlash against the Supreme Court empowered 
racial demagogues who were willing to employ violence against black 
demonstrators, even after it became apparent that televised 
confrontations played directly into the tactical goals of the civil rights 
movement.53 
The grassroots protests of civil rights activists forced a reluctant 
federal government to dismantle the legal underpinnings of Jim Crow. 
Klarman concludes that the moral example of the nonviolent civil 
rights movement, more than the abstract guarantees of racial 
nondiscrimination announced by Brown, convinced most white 
Americans to accept the principle of legal equality. The violent 
crackdowns against civil rights marchers in Birmingham (1963) and 
Selma (1965), which played out on the television news programs, 
"transformed racial opinion in the North" (p. 364) and "ultimately 
rallied national opinion behind the enforcement of Brown and the 
enactment of civil rights legislation" (p. 385). Congress passed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed segregation in public 
accommodations, granted the Justice Department authority to file 
school desegregation lawsuits against local jurisdictions, and 
authorized the termination of federal funds for noncompliant 
districts.54 One year later, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, which provided for federal enforcement of the Fifteenth 
Amendment and helped to produce a sea change in southern politics.55 
Within a decade, southern states led the nation in the number of black 
office holders, and the region contained a higher percentage of black 
students attending desegregated public schools than any other part of 
52. See, e.g. ,  Garrow, supra note 6. 
53. Klarman asks: "Would the same violence have confronted civil rights demonstrators 
without Brown?" He answers that "[o]ne cannot know for certain . . . .  How southern whites 
in this counterfactual universe would have responded if and when black street 
demonstrations erupted is impossible to tell." P. 442. At some point, readers may begin to 
wonder if the combination of speculative conclusions and counterfactual scenarios is subject 
to the law of diminishing returns. 
54. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)-(e)(5) (2000). 
55. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). 
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the country.56 Klarman concludes that "[t]he 1964 Civil Rights Act, not 
Brown, was plainly the proximate cause of most school desegregation 
in the South" (p. 363). When the Supreme Court returned to 
desegregation jurisprudence in the mid-1960s, the justices "were 
following, not leading, national opinion. The civil rights movement 
had overtaken the school desegregation process, and the political 
branches of the national government were now playing the vanguard 
role" (p. 343). 
The book ends here but the story does not. The most glaring, and 
most puzzling, omission in From Jim Crow to Civil Rights is its failure 
to examine in almost any depth the actual impact of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, especially vis-a-vis the substantial involvement of the 
judicial branch in the process of school desegregation during the 
second decade after Brown.51 Executive branch enforcement of the 
Civil Rights Act originally targeted the noncompliant rural districts 
that maintained complete segregation, and federal policy initially 
required only that localities implement the minimalist "freedom-of­
choice" formulas already approved by the courts. The Johnson 
administration began to demand more substantive integration 
procedures in the late 1960s, but executive branch oversight played a 
relatively minor role in the population centers of the urban South, 
where most districts instead operated under judicial supervision 
because of ongoing NAACP litigation.58 Then the Supreme Court 
transformed desegregation case law in Green v. New Kent County, 
which dismantled the "all deliberate speed" regime and charged 
school districts with "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might 
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial 
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."59 Under these 
expansive guidelines, rooted in the soaring text if not the original 
intent of Brown, the NAACP convinced several district courts to 
order busing to overcome state-sponsored patterns of residential 
56. See QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 
1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994); see also GARY ORFIELD & 
FRANKLIN MONFORT, NAT'L SCH. Bos. Assoc., STATUS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: 
THE NEXT GENERATION (1992). 
57. Klarman dedicates only a few pages to the process of school desegregation after 
1964. Pp. 341-43, 362-63. For a more balanced account of the role of executive branch 
agencies and federal courts in the enforcement of Brown between the mid-1960s and the 
mid-1970s, see JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS 
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001). 
58. See GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE 
SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1969); see also J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, 
FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION, 1954-1978 
(1979). 
59. 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). 
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segregation in urban schools, a novel and far-reaching extension of 
state-action doctrine. District Judge James B. McMillan pioneered the 
two-way busing of black and white students to integrate 
"neighborhood schools" in a landmark 1969 decision that galvanized 
enormous white resistance but was ultimately affirmed by the 
Supreme Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg.(J() 
This combination of NAACP litigation and federal court rulings -
not the direct consequences of the Civil Rights Act and certainly not a 
monolithic expression of "northern public opinion" - played the 
crucial role in producing the dramatic surge in school desegregation 
that transformed southern public education in the early 1970s.61 The 
ratio of southern black students attending desegregated schools 
increased to about one-sixth in 1967 and to one-third in 1969 before 
skyrocketing to more than three-fourths by 1973 (although only about 
two-thirds of this group attended majority-white schools).62 Executive 
branch enforcement deserves a substantial portion of the credit for the 
acceleration of desegregation during the half-decade after the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, but only the emergence of court-ordered busing can 
explain the mushroom effect that followed the Supreme Court's 
approval of the expansive remedy in Swann. In fact, opponents of 
busing often cited the text of the Civil Rights Act, in which Congress 
(at the insistence of northern members) specified that "nothing herein 
shall empower any official or court of the United States to issue any 
order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring 
the transportation of pupils or students from one school to another or 
one school district to another. "63 The escalation of southern school 
desegregation between 1969 and 1973 also occurred despite the Nixon 
White House's direct orders to executive branch enforcement officials 
to avoid busing and to hold integration to the minimum required by 
60. 300 F. Supp. 1358 (1969); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 
(1971). For the broader story behind the political backlash against court-ordered busing, 
including the Charlotte litigation, see LASSITER, supra note 46. 
61. Contrary to the political mythology that court-ordered busing failed completely as 
public policy, comprehensive plans produced substantial integration in a number of urban 
school systems in the South during the early 1970s. The key variable for successful 
implementation involved the prior consolidation of city school systems with surrounding 
counties, which reduced the problem of "white flight" to the suburbs through the 
establishment of countywide districts and allowed busing programs to overcome 
metropolitan patterns of residential segregation. See GARY ORFIELD & FRANKLIN 
MONFORT, NAT'L SCH. Bos. Assoc., RACIAL CHANGE AND DESEGREGATION IN LARGE 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1988). 
62. P. 363. The figures Klarman cites are somewhat inflated because they include black 
students in predominantly black schools with only a few white students, but the general 
trajectory of acceleration is accurate. For comparison, nineteen percent of southern black 
students attended majority-white schools in 1968, and forty-five percent did by 1972. See 
ORFIELD & MONFORT, supra note 56, at 14. 
63. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)-(e)(5) (2000). 
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law.64 In the face of concerted political backlash, the federal judges 
who advanced the busing jurisprudence grounded their authority 
primarily in the long shadow of Brown's pronouncement of the 
constitutional principle that "[ s )eparate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal," combined with an unprecedented willingness to 
investigate the de jure roots of allegedly de facto segregation resulting 
from housing patterns and neighborhood schools.65 
The pivotal role of court-ordered busing in many southern cities 
challenges Klarman's model of judicial minimalism and requires 
revision - but not abandonment - of his thesis that Supreme Court 
decisions never venture far beyond mainstream public opinion. In 
1973, in Keyes v. Denver, the Court found a large city outside of the 
South guilty of de jure methods of racial discrimination in the 
maintenance of segregated neighborhood schools, and the national 
backlash against busing intensified as civil rights jurisprudence moved 
northward and westward.66 A year later, in Milliken v. Bradley, the 
justices overturned a district court plan to consolidate the city and 
suburban school districts of metropolitan Detroit in order to 
implement comprehensive two-way busing throughout the region.67 
The specter of public opinion, and the inherent politicization of 
constitutional law, plainly shaped the outcome of Milliken, not least 
because Richard Nixon had recently appointed four of the justices in 
the five-member majority that delivered the NAACP's first landmark 
defeat in school desegregation case law.68 While Swann presents a 
difficult case, Milliken fits more smoothly into Klarman's analytical 
framework, which offers little comfort to those who believe that the 
Supreme Court should act as an engine of social change. In the 
conclusion, he observes that "the justices reflect dominant public 
opinion too much for them to protect truly oppressed groups" (p. 449). 
Instead, the "courts are likely to protect only those minorities that are 
favorably regarded by majority opinion. . . . [N)ot a single Court 
decision involving race clearly contravened national public opinion" 
during the era between Plessy and Brown (p. 450). 
64. See GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? SEGREGATION AND NATIONAL POLICY 
(1978). 
65. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
66. 413 U.S. 189 (1973); see also ORFIELD, supra note 64. 
67. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
68. Klarman does not mention Keyes or Milliken, and the book contains only a fleeting 
reference to Swann. Pp. 341-42. Although the book is focused primarily on the Jim Crow 
regime in the South, only in the final two chapters about Brown does the northern context 
disappear altogether, except for the monolithic role played by northern public opinion in 
establishing the civil rights legislation of the rnid-1960s. 
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At the beginning of the book, Klarman assures readers that the 
narrative to follow "makes no claim about how judges should decide 
cases. This is not a work of normative constitutional theory" (p. 5). 
Perhaps this caveat is true, but the evidence and the arguments 
marshaled throughout this examination of seventy years of American 
history consistently point in the same direction: legislative actions 
matter far more than federal court decisions; the ability of judges to 
implement social change is quite limited; long-term historical 
processes shape the evolution of constitutional law far more than vice 
versa. Near the end, Klarman asks "[w]hat lessons shall we draw from 
this study about the consequences of Court rulings?" (p. 454). Citing 
the persistent discrimination against blacks through allegedly color­
blind laws and public policies, he points out that "[c]onstitutional 
interpretation that is limited to form and is unwilling to delve into 
substance is vulnerable to nullification by determined resistance" (p. 
457). Instead of providing positive guarantees of substantive equality, 
"constitutional rights are generally limited to negative constraints on 
government" (p. 461 ) . In broader perspective, Klarman warns that 
more recent judicial activism in areas such as abortion and gay rights, 
where public opinion is deeply divided and constitutional law is 
unclear, has galvanized fierce political backlashes reminiscent of the 
rise of massive resistance to Brown (p. 464-66). But since backlashes 
against the expansion of constitutional rights can also generate 
counter-backlashes, as well as embolden rights-based movements to 
push for legislative as well as judicial protection, history remains an 
unpredictable guide to the future. Still, Klarman cautions that social 
movements miscalculate when they elevate litigation over alternative 
strategies, including direct-action protests and legislative victories, 
because of the "limited capacity of lawsuits alone to produce social 
change" (p. 467). "Court decisions do matter," Klarman concludes in 
this formidable and controversial book, "[b ]ut they cannot 
fundamentally transform a nation" (p. 468). 
